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COMMON-LAW PLEADING - STILL SURVIVES
AS THE BASIS OF MODERN REMEDIAL LAW
ALISON REPPY
COMMON-LAW PLEADING, the ancient methodology used for bring-
ing legal issues before the courts of England, is as old as the Anglo-
Saxon legal system and as new as yesterday's cases before the trial
and appellate courts of the United States. First formed and culti-
vated as a science in the reign of Edward I (1272-1306)1 and further
ALISON REPPY is Dean and Professor of Law at New York Law School.
1 See comment in SrpHE , A TRATISE -ON THE PPJnCiPLES OF PLEADING IN
CrViL ACTIONS, C. II, 147 (3d Am. ed. by Tyler, Washington, D. C. 1893). Cf. The State-
ment of Sm MATHEW HALE, in T=E HISTORY OF =n COMMON LAW, c. VIII, 173 (4th
ed. Dublin, 1792).
In general on the subject of common-law pleading, see the following:
Treatises: GLANvInL, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNIT ANGLIAE
(1187-1189) [New edition edited by George E. Woodbine, 4 vols., (New Haven, 1932)1;
BRACTON, Da LEomus AND CONSETUDINmUS AGLAE (1250-1258); CASUS PLACITORUM,
a collection of decisions of judges, all of whom lived before 1260; according to Holds-
worth, and which in style and subject matter anticipated the Year Books; FET ASSAVER
(before 1267), a tract on procedure probably by Hengham, and reported in WOODBINE,
FOUR TmRTEENTH CENTURY LAW TRACTS (New Haven, 1910); CADIT ASSISA (1267 or
after), a summary of that part of Bracton's Treatise dealing with the Assizd of Mort
d'Ancestor [new edition by Sir Travers Twiss, London 1878-1883]; HENGHA , MAGNA
(1270-1275), based on ]fracton, and containing information on the rules of pleading and
procedure in the real actions; HENGuAar, PARVA (1285 or after), containing instruction as
to pleading and procedure in certain real actions; BRITTON, ANCIENT PLEAS OF THE
CROWN (Trans. by F. M. Nichols, 1290); FLETA, AN EPITOME OF BRITTON (1290);
ARTICUmI AD NOVAS NARRATIoNEs (1326-1340), consisting for most part precedents of
pleading; REGISTER OF WRITS (1326-1377); PYNSoN'S BOOK OF ENTRIES (1510); FITz-
HERBERT, NATURA BREvImm (1534), a selection of writs together with a commentary;
RASTELL'S ENTRIES (1564); THELOALL, DIGEST OF ORIGINAL WRITS AND TD=NGS CON-
CERNING THEM (1579), a most orderly treatise on procedure grounded on the Year Books
and printed at the end of the 1687 edition of the REGISTER OF WRITS; COKE, BOoK OF
ENTRms (1614); Powsri, ATToRNEY's ACADEMY (1623); EUER, DOCTRINA PLACITANDI,
or THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PLEADING (1640); COKE, DECLARATIONS AND PLEADINGS con-
tained in his eleven Books of Reports (1650); ASTON, PLACITA LATiNE REDIVVA: A BOOK
oF ENTRIES (1661-1673); BROWNE, FORMUL.AE BENE PLACITANDI. A BOOK OF ENTIES
(1671, 1675); LIBER PLACITANDI (London, 1674), a book of special pleadings containing
precedents; VIVIAN, THE EXACT PLEADER; A BOOK OF ENTRIS (1684); CLIFT, A NEW
BOOK OF DECLARATIONS, PLEADINGS, VERDICTS, JUDGMENTS, AND JUDICIAL WRITS, WITH
THE ENTRIES THEREUPON (1703, 1719); LUZY, A COLLECTION OF MODEM ENTRIES (1723,
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an English edition appeared in 1741); EUER, A SYSTEM oF PLEADING, including trans-
lation of the DOCTRINA PLACITANDI, OR THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PLEADING (Dublin,
1791); AMERICAN PRECEDENTS AND DECLARATIONS (Boston, 1802); WENTWORTH, A Come-
PLETE SYSTEM OF PLEADINGS (London, 1797-99); STORY, PLEADINGS IN CIVIL ACTIONS
(Salem, 1805); LAWES, ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON PLEADING (London, 1806) [Ist Amer.
from 1st London ed. (Portsmouth, N. H., 1808)]; BOOTH, THE NATURE AND PRACTICE
OF REAL ACTIONS (Ist Amer. ed. New York, 1808); LAWES, PRACTICAL TREATISE ON
PLEADING (Boston, 1811); HENING, THE AMERICAN PLEADER AND LAWYER'S GUIDE, 2 vols.
-(New York, 1811); CHrTTY, TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIES TO ACTIONS, 2 vols.
(2d ed. by Day, New York, 1812); HARRIS, MODERN ENTRIES, 2 vols. (Edited by Evans,
Baltimore, 1821); JACKSON, TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE OF REAL ACTIONS
(Boston, 1828); SAUNDERS, THE LAW OF PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ACTIONS (2d
Am. ed. Philadelphia, 1831; GOULD, TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADINGS IN CIVIL
ACTIONS (1832); CRIZTY, PRECEDENTS IN PLEADING, 2 vols. (1st Am. ed. Springfield,
1839); TYRWHITT, PLEADING (London, 1846); WILLIAMS, INTRODUCTION TO PLEADING AND
PRACTICE (London, 1857); STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS, A VIEW
OF THE WHOLE PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT AT LAW (From 2d London ed. by Samuel Tyler,
Washington, 1872); CHiTTY, TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIES TO ACTIONS, WITH
PRECEDENTS AND FORMS (London, 1808, 16th Amer. ed. by J. C. Perkins, Springfield,
1876); EVANS, PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS (2d ed. by William Miller, Chicago, 1879);
CHITTY, TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIES TO ACTIONS (16th Am. ed. Springfield,
Mass., 1879); HEARD, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PLEADING (Boston, 1880); MAITLAND AND
BAILDON, THE COURT BARON, (London, 1891); SHIN, TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PRAC-
TICE (Chicago, 1892); MCKELVEY, PRINCIPLES OF COMMON-LAw PLEADING (Ist ed. New
York, 1894); STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS (3d Am. ed. by Tyler,
Washington, 1895); SHINN, TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1896);
POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN COURTS OF COMMON LAW (Baltimore, 1897); PERRY,
COMMON-LAW PLEADING (Boston, 1897); MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE AT COMMON LAW
(St. Paul, 1905); MAITLAND, EQUITY, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (Cam-
bridge, 1909); WOODBINE, FOUR THIRTEENTH CENTURY LAW TRACTS [on Pleading] (New
Haven, 1910), containing: JUDICIUM ESSONIORUM (1267-1275), a tract on essoins prob-
ably also by Hengham; EXCEPTIONS AD CASSANDUM BREVIA (1285) [tract on the writs];
MODUS COMPONENDI BREVIA (1285); CUM SIT NECESSARIUM OR MODUS CASSANDUMd BREVIA
(1285 or after), [a tract on the writs]; MILLAR, COMMoN-LAw PLEADING (Chicago, 1914);
PUTERBAUGH, COMMON LAW PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN ILLINOIS (9th ed. by L. D. Puter-
baugh, Chicago, 1917); WINFIELD, HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCE-
DURE (Cambridge, 1921) ; SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAW (New
York, 1922); SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING (3d ed. Ballantine, St.
Paul, 1923); BULLEN AND LEAKE'S PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGS IN ACTIONS IN THE KING'S
BENCH DIVISION OF THE HIGr COURT OF JUSTICE (8th ed. by W. Wyatt-Paine, London,
1924; 9th ed. London, 1935); O'DoNNELL, PROCEDURE AND FORMS OF COMMON LAW
PLEADING (Washington, D. C., 1934); PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW (3d ed. London, 1940; 4th ed. London, 1948); FnFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF
THE COMMON LAW (London, 1949); ODGERS, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN
CIVIL ACTIONS IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (1st ed. London, 1891; 3d ed. London,
1897; 4th ed. London, 1900; 5th ed. London, 1903; 6th ed. London, 1906; 7th ed. Lon-
don, 1912; 14th ed. London, 1952).
Casebooks: AmES, A SELECTION OF CASES ON PLEADING (1st ed. Cambridge, 1875;
2d ed. Cambridge, 1905); SHIPP AND DAiSH, CASES ILLUSTRATING COMMON-LAw PLEAD-
ING (Chicago, 1903); KEEN, CASES ON PLEADING (Boston, 1905); SUNDERLAND, CASES
ON COMMON-LAW PLEADING (Chicago, 1913); LLOYD, CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (In-
dianapolis, 1915); SCOTT, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (Cam-
bridge, 1915); WHITTIER AND MORGAN, CASES ON COMMON-LAW PLEADING (St. Paul,
1916); COOK AND HINTON, CASES ON PLEADING AT COMMON LAW (Chicago, 1923);
REPPY, CASES ON PLEADING AT COMMON LAW (New York, 1926); MAGILL, CASES ON
CIVI PROCEDURE (St. Paul, 1927); LLOYD, CASES ON PLEADING IN ACTIONS AT LAW
(Indianapolis, 1927); CLARK, CASES ON COMMON-LAW PLEADING (Cincinnati, 1931);
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perfected during the reign of Edward III (1326-1377),2 it has
served each succeeding generation as an effective instrument in the
administration of justice, and today is still very much alive, both as an
operating system and as a guiding force in the recurring waves of
reform designed to correct its real and imagined abuses.
For more than six centuries it was the only method of pleading
in the common-law courts of England-King's Bench, Exchequer and
Common Pleas-and for two hundred years it was the exclusive
procedural device leading to the trial of legal issues in the United
States.
It was, however, subject to many defects, due largely to the fact
that the entire English procedural system had grown up in a patch-
work fashion,3 while the constantly expanding substantive law was
outgrowing the forms of action which gave it birth. In the latter part
of the Eighteenth and early part of the Nineteenth Centuries, under
the impetus of Bentham's searing criticism of the existing system of
law in England, with its courts, its special pleading, and its general
atmosphere of delay and administrative inefficiency, these restrictive
influences became clear to the people, a demand for reform sprang
up and the movement for the improvement of procedure slowly got
under way.
The impact of this development, strangely enough, first bore
fruit in America with the framing of Livingston's Code4 of Procedure
KEIGWIN, CASES ON ComMon-LAw PLEADING (1st ed. Rochester, 1926; 2d ed. Rochester,
1934); COOK AND HINTON, CASES ON PLEADING AT COMMoN LAW (revision of Part I,
Common Law Actions) (Chicago, 1940); ATKINSON, INTRODUCTION TO PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE (Columbia, 1940); ScoTT AM SIMPsoN, CASES AND OMER MATERIALS ON
JUDICIAL REMEDIES (Cambridge, 1946); ScoTT AND SIMPSON, CASES AND OTHER MA-
TER S ON CIVIL PiOCEDURE (Boston, 1950); REPPv, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE (Buffalo, 1954).
2 In referring to the improvement in the science of pleading, Sir Edward Coke de-
dared: "In the reign of Edward I1 [1326-1377] pleadings grew to perfection, both with-
out lameness and curiosity; for then the judges and professors of law were excellently
learned, and then knowledge of the law flourished; the serjeants of the law, &c. drew
their own pleadings, and therefore [it was] truly said by Justice Thirning, in the reign
of Henry IV [1399-1413] that in the time of Edward III the law was in a higher degree
than it had been any time before; for before that time the manner of pleading was but
feeble, in comparison of that it was afterward in the reign of the same king." 1 COKE,
upon LITTLETON, 304 b, Lib. 3, Cap. 9, § 534 (1st Amer. from the 16th European
ed. by Francis Hargrave and Charles Butler, Philadelphia, 1812).
3 "The remedial part of the law resembles a mass of patchwork, made up at inter-
vals and by piece-meal, without any preconceived plan or system, for the purpose of
meeting the exigencies of the times by temporary expedients." WALKER'S INTRODUCTION
TO AMERICAN LAW, Pt. VI, Lecture XXXV, 569 (4th ed. Boston, 1905).
4 Louisiana Act of April 10, 1805.
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and the Penal Code in 1824, which was never adopted.5 This was
followed in England by the adoption of the Hilary Rules in 1833,0
and in the United States by the New York Code of Procedure in
1848.1 Thereafter, in relatively quick succession, the English Parlia-
ment enacted the Common Law Procedure Acts of 1852,8 1854,1 and
1860,10 and the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts of 187311 and
1875,12 now for the most part replaced by the Supreme Court of
Judicature (Consolidation) Act of 1925.13 And in 1938 the Supreme
Court of the United States made effective the new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 4 In consequence thereof, both at home and abroad,
5 Livingston's Penal Code authorized by the Act of February 10, 1821, and com-
pleted in 1824, was never enacted into law as such by the Legislature of Louisiana.
Edward Livingston was born in 1764 and died in 1836, or about six years after
Field began his professional career. A native of New York, and a brother of Chancellor
Robert R. Livingston, his Penal Code of Louisiana, which was published in 1824, at-
tracted great attention in England and on the Continent. DAVm DUDLEy FIELD CEN-
TENARY ESSAYS, 19 (Edited by Reppy, New York, 1949).
6 The Hilary Rules, designed to restore the ancient strict common-law theory as
to the scope of the general issue, were promulgated pursuant to the Law Amendment
Act, 3 & 4 Win. IV, c. 42, § 1 (1883).
For the history and effect of the Hilary Rules in England, see article by HOLDS-
woRTH, The New Rules of Pleading of the Hilary Term, 1 Cambridge L. J. 261 (1923);
for the history and effect of the Hilary Rules in the several states of the United States,
see, REPPY, The Hilary Rules and Their Effect on Negative and Affirmative Pleas under
Modern Codes and Practice Acts, 6 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 95 (1929).
7 "After careful consideration and amendment by the New York Legislature, the
draft [of a proposed code] was enacted into law on April 12, 1848, N. Y. Laws 1848,
c. 379, to become effective on July 1 of the same year. Written in the form of a code
containing 391 sections, it became known at once as the Code of Procedure or as the
Field Code. This title was far too broad in scope as the act related only to a small
portion of the adjective law, and expressly retained the old common law or statutory
rule where not expressly abolished by the Code." REPPY, THE FiELD COnIICATION
CONCEPT, in the DAvID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY EssAYs, 17, 33-34 (Edited by Reppy,
New York, 1949).
8 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76.
9 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125.
10 23 & 24 Vict. c. 126.
11 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66.
12 37 & 38 Vict. c. 77.
13 15 & 16 Geo. V. c. 49.
14 The Federal Rules were drafted by an Advisory Committee appointed by the
Supreme Court under the authority of a federal statute enacted in 1934. Act of June
19, 1934, c. 651, §§ 1, 2; 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U. S. C. §§ 723b, 723c. See, on the earlier
phases of the struggle for federal procedural reform, article by SHELTON, The Reform, of
Judicial Procedure, 1 Va. L. Rev. 89 (1913).
For detailed information concerning the adoption, backgrounding and drafting of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see CLARK, HANDBOOK or TE LAw OF CODE
PLr.EADiN, c. I, History, Systems and Function of Pleading, 31-39 (2d ed., St. Paul, 1947).
In this connection it should- be recalled that progress in the reform of criminal
procedure has followed up and to some extent paralleled the reform of the civil proce-
dure which has been under way since 1848. In 1930 the American Law Institute issued
its Code of Criminal Procedure, which has subsequently substantially influenced state
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the system of pleading as developed at common law, has been modi-
fied by judicial decision, changed by statute, or by rule of court, and
in some jurisdictions ostensibly swept away in its entirety-so the
reformers thought-but subsequent events have cast grave doubts on
this conclusion, as the solemn and stubborn fact is that common-law
pleading still survives as the basis of our modern remedial law. 5
Select any individual and you will find that he is what he is today
because of what his father and mother were yesterday; he cannot
escape his ancestry, but must make his way through life with the
physical, mental, moral and spiritual assets with which he was natural-
ly endowed by the union of his parents. It is true that within certain
limits he may seem to change his environment, acquire a better train-
ing, and contribute more to the community than did his forbears,
but any advance or improvement he may make must be done within
the limits of his ancestral background. And so it is with institutions
such as the law which, after all, are merely the product of joint in-
dividual effort. The law is what it is today because of what the law
was yesterday; it cannot escape its ancestry, and it, too, must progress
against the background of its history. Like the individual, so with
the common-law system of procedure, which we all proudly claim
as a priceless part of our Anglo-Saxon heritage, we may change, we
may add to or take away those parts of the system which have out-
grown their usefulness, just as the modern common-law actions super-
seded the old real actions"8 when they became archaic, but it is no
criminal procedural developments in the several states. In 1941, pursuant to the rule-
making authority granted to the Supreme Court by Congress, the Advisory Committee
on Rules of Criminal Procedure appointed by the Court, published two Preliminary
Drafts, with notes, in its Final Report to the Court in June, 1944. The rules suggested
therein were adopted by the Court on December 26, 1944, to become effective three
months after the adjournment of Congress, or on March 21, 1946. The Court also-gave
directions that the rules be reported to Congress in accordance with the terms of the
Enabling Act, 323 U. S. 821, 65 S. Ct. XI, note 97 (1944).
See, also, Editorial, "To Form a More Perfect Union" 32 A. B. A. J. 90 (1946);
Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Part I, 55 Yale L. J. 694-714
(1946); Part II, 56 Yale L. J. 197-257 (1947).
15 "While the new rules have abolished the distinctive common law forms, the
essential and differentiating rules applicable to pleading as established at common law
still survive as a basis of remedial law." MITURN, J., in Ward v. Huff, 94 N. J. L. 81,
84, 109 A. 287, 288 (1919).
3. The old real actions fell under one of the heads of Blackstone's famous classifica-
tion of actions as real, personal and mixed. The real actions were by far the most
important during the early developmental period of the common law. Included therein
were writs of right proper and writs in the nature of writs of right, such writs, among
others, as the writ of right de rationabili parte, the writ of advowson, the writ of
dower, the writ of dower under nihil habet, and the writ of quare impedit. These
actions were feudal in character and were concerned with disputes over land. Because
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more possible in any realistic sense to abolish the system in its en-
tirety, with all its implications for both the past and the future, than
it is for an individual to destroy his ancestry, or for mankind to
abolish history or civilization.
Infinite damage has been done to the cause of legitimate legal
reform, to the cause of legal education, at the expense of litigants,
students of law, and the public welfare generally, by proclaiming the
concept that all that has gone before in our procedural ancestry
should be regarded as obsolete and worthless,' 7 and is not to be con-
sidered in terms of modern pleading and practice, and in terms of
modern legal education. Those who take this limited view have clear-
ly confused the real merits of the common-law system with those
portions of the system which were needlessly technical, thus over-
looking the salient fact that it had developed many sound and en-
during principles of legal procedure. They have also overlooked the
fact that there is greater similarity in the essential principles under-
lying pleading at common law, in equity, under modern codes and
practice acts, and even under the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
now in effect in the federal courts, than is generally realized.18 More-
of the technicalities required in their control and the length of time involved in carrying
their process through, these actions, along with those which fell under the other two
heads, were gradually superseded by what are now known as the eleven modern common-
law, personal actions, as a result of evolutionary steps in the development of the
common law. What had, in effect, long before occurred as a matter of practice, was
officially recognized by the REA PROPERTY LiMITATiON ACT OF 1833, 3 & 4 Win. IV, c. 27,
§ 36, which swept aside the real and mixed actions, with certain exceptions, effective
December 31, 1834.
17 Sm MONTAGUE CRACKENTHORPE, O.C., in an address to the American Bar Associa-
tion, in reference to the utility of the study of common-law pleading, stated: "In the
hands of those who understood it, the system [of common-law pleading] was infallible
in attaining the purpose for which it existed. If all who brought causes to trial had
possessed a proper acquaintance with this branch of law and a reasonable mental
alertness, it would never have been hinted that pleading was a means of turning the
decision of a question from 'the very right of the matter' to immaterial points. But
pleaders of inferior and slovenly mental disposition suffered themselves to be misled,
deliberately it is to be feared, by their more acute brethren; and the popular mind
came to consider the whole system a mere series of traps and pitfalls for the unwary,
-an impediment to justice that must be abolished. In truth, even these evils might
well have been remedied by allowing free liberty of amendment, and reducing to a
moderate sum the costs payable on the grant of such privilege. Those concerned in
reform movements, however, often lose sight of their real object in a feverish anxiety
to 'cut deep' and at once; and this explains why the system for bringing a cause to
trial in convenient and exact form was discarded." Note, Common Law Pleading, 10
Harv. L. Rev. 238, 239 (1896).
18 "There is no rule regulating the substance of pleadings under the codes which is
not either taken directly from the older system, or framed by analogy in the application
of the same principles. The experience of the past thirty years has demonstrated that
the codes have by no means brought about that perfect completeness and simplicity
[VOL, 2
COMMON-LAW PLEADING
over, the essential elements of causes of action which must be pleaded
have not been abolished by the reformed procedure, nor have the
fundamental conceptions common to all systems of procedure as to
the manner of making allegations which reveal the contentions of the
rival parties, been changed. As Lord Mansfield so well said: "The
substantive rules of pleading are founded in strong sense, and in the
soundest and clearest logic, and so appear, when well understood and
explained, though by being misunderstood and misapplied, they are
made use of as instruments of chicane."' 9 As a result of such mis-
application and chicanery by men who resorted to the technicalities
of special pleading to serve their own selfish ends, as a result of the
portrayal by its enemies of the system as a mere game of skill, in
which the helpless litigant became a pawn in a wilderness of arbitrary
in all forms of legal procedure hoped for and predicted by their supporters, and expected,
perhaps, during the earlier years of their adoption." SnIPMAN, CODE PLEADING: THE
AID OF THE EARLIER SYSTEmS, 7 Yale L. J. 197 (1898).
"The problems and functions and principles of pleading are essentially the same in all
systems, whether at common law, under the code, in equity, or by rule of court."
SHIPMA, HANDBOOK OF ComanoN-LAw PLEADING, Introduction, 7, 8 (3d ed. by Ballan-
tine, St. Paul, 1923).
"It is believed that, aside from technical and formal requirements, there is no rule
regulating the substance of pleadings under the codes which is not either taken directly
from the older system, or framed by analogy in the application of the same principles."
See 4 STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PROCEDURE, Introduction, § 11 (Los Angeles & Chicago,
1911).
Thus, in Minnesota, in the case of Solomon v. Vinson, 31 Minn. 205, 17 N. W. 340
(1883), a code complaint which alleged, among other things, that the defendant was
indebted to the plaintiff on an account past due, for goods sold and delivered, was held
to contain all the allegations necessary to constitute a good indebtedness count in an ac-
tion of debt at common law, the court remarking that "under that system of pleading
it was just as necessary to allege the facts as it is under the Code."
In Crump v. Mims, .64 N. C. 768, 771 (1870), Rodman, J., declared: "We take
occasion here to suggest to pleaders that the rules of the common law as to pleading,
which are only the rules of logic, have not been abolished by The Code. Pleas should
not state the evidence, but the facts, which are the conclusions from the evidence,
according to their legal effect; and complaints should especially avoid wandering into
matter which if traversed would not lead to a decisive issue. It is the object of all plead-
ing to arrive at some single, simple and material issue."
In accord: Parsley v. Nicholson, 65 N. C. 207, 210 (1870).
In Henry Inv. Co. v. Semonian, 40 Colo. 269, 90 P. 682 (1907), CAMPBELL, J., stated:
"A count in indebitatus assumpsit, framed substantially as required at common law, is
now held to be a sufficient compliance with the Code mandate as to allegations of fact."
Rules of the common-law pleading, as to materiality, certainty, prolixity, and ob-
scurity, are rules of logic not abolished by the North Carolina Code. Crump v. Mims,
64 N. C. 768, 771 (1870).
The Rules of Pleading at Common Law have not been abrogated by the Code of
Civil Procedure. The essential principles still remain. Henry Inv. Co. v. Semonian, 40
Colo. 269, 90 P. 682 (1907); HuGHEs, PROCEDURE, ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE, 488 (Chi-
cago, 1905).
19 Robinson v. Raley, 1 Burr, 317, 319, 97 Eng. Rep. 330, 331 (1757).
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technicality and confusion; in which it was pictured as the master
and not the servant of the courts, or as an end in itself, instead of
an instrument for the fair and equitable adjustment of substantive
human rights, the system of pleading and procedure as developed
at common law, was gradually brought into popular disrepute by the
efforts of well-meaning reformers, who emphasized its admitted de-
fects, but failed to point out to the people of England and the
United States the matchless precision of the old system as a vehicle
for reducing human controversies into distinct issues of fact or of
law, which could be satisfactorily adjusted, thus achieving the prin-
cipal end of all government, to wit, the preservation of law and order.
Entirely too much time and effort have been expended in criticizing"0
or eulogizing2 the common-law system of pleading. It now seems ap-
20 Thus, the famous historian, Rnavas, in referring to the times of Henry VI [1422-
1461) and Edward IV [1461-1483], stated: "Such was the humor of the age that
captiousness was not discountenanced by the bench. . . .The calamity has been that
after other branches of knowledge took a more liberal turn, the minutiae of pleading
continued to be respected with a sort of religious deference." 3 HISTORY oF ENoLISIX
LAW, c. 23, 621 (Finlason ed. Philadelphia, 1880).
In Allen v. Scott, 13 f11. 80, 84 (1851), CAToN, J., said: "It must be admitted that
many of these distinctions are more artificial than substantial, and do not contribute
very essentially to the promotion of the ends of justice. So long, however, as we look
to the rules of the common law to govern us in pleading, we are not at liberty to
disregard them."
Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Wieczorek, 151 Ill. 579, 586, 38 N. E. 678, 680 (1894).
"By the wooden manner in which it came to be administered, many of its artificial
distinctions and rules became an obstacle to the very purposes which they were intended
to serve, and diverted the attention of the court to side issues, so that the suitor was
perhaps unable to get through the vestibule of justice to have the merits of his case
considered." SmPMN, HANDBOOK or Commox LAW PLEADING, Introducton, 6, n. 11
(2d ed. by Ballantine, St. Paul, 1923).
21 Among the eulogies by judges, Lawyers and Writers may be listed the following:
Littleton, during the reign of Edward IV [1461-1483], in referring to the art of
common-law pleading, declared: "And know, my son, that it is one of the most
honourable, laudable, and profitable things in our law, to have the science of well plead-
ing in actions real and personal; and therefore I counsel thee especially to imploy thy
courage and care to learn it." 2 CoxE, upon L=rrLETON [INsTTrTs or Tm LAws op
ENGLAND) Lib. 3, Cap. 9, § 534 (1st Amer. from the 16th European ed. Philadelphia,
1812).
PaormsoR SA:mrm TYLER stated: "It [the common-law system of pleading] must
be admitted to be the greatest of all judicial inventions." FiasT RaroRT oF TM MA Y-
LAND ComIassoRs oN RrLns or PRAc-icE r rIN CouRTs, 80, 81 (Frederick, 1855).
"This [the common law] system, matured by the wisdom of ages, founded on
principles of truth and sound reason, has been ruthlessly abolished in many of our
States, who have rashly substituted in its place the suggestions of sciolists, who invent
new codes and systems of pleading to order. But this attempt to. abolish all species,
and establish a single genus, is found to be beyond the power of legislative omnipotence.
They cannot compel the human mind not to distinguish between things that differ. The
distinction between the different forms of actions for different wrongs, requiring different
remedies, lies in the nature of things; it is absolutely inseparable from the correct
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propriate that its function as a workable and expanding instrument of
justice for generations, in both England and America, should be point-
ed up and emphasized as well as its long-term significance as the
fountain-source of our modern substantive and remedial rights, if not
our very liberties,22 and finally, its value as an influence which con-
tinues and must inevitably continue to mould future Anglo-Saxon
conceptions of law and justice in a free society, if we are to preserve
our ideal of government by law as opposed to government by men. 3
What, then, is the place of common-law pleading in the law
and what is its real significance to modern procedure?
1. The Place of Common-Law Pleading in the Law.-Anglo-
American law has been separated into two main divisions-public
law-which has to do with the regulation of relations between inde-
pendent states and between a state and its citizens and-private law-
which regulates the relations between the citizens of the state. Public
and private law, in turn, are divided into two branches, to wit, substan-
administration of justice in common-law courts." GRIER, J., in McFaul v. Ramsey, 20
How. (U. S.) 523, 525, 15 L. Ed. 1010, 1011 (1857).
According to PROFESSOR KEiowIT, CASES ON CODE PLEADING, Introduction, 16
(Rochester, N. Y., 1926), the Code has been of doubtful value in simplifying procedure:
"One who will read the reports of New York or of any other Code State will observe
that before the reform few cases turned upon points of pleading, and that most of
such cases involved questions of substantive law which were presented in technical
guise by reasons of their development upon the record; it will also be observed that
the adoption of the Code was at once followed by a large increase of litigation con-
cerning procedural matters, which kind of litigation shows no present signs of abatement.
Indeed, the current digests disclose an immensely greater number of cases deciding pure
matters of pleading in the Code States than cases of that kind coming from common law
jurisdictions. One reason, of course, is that the common law system is so thoroughly
settled that few novel questions can arise."
For a statement of similar tenor, see GREEN, Treatise in Pleading and Practice
Under the Code System (St. Louis, 1879).
"'The love of innovation induced the State of New York some years ago, to
abrogate common-law pleading, and introduce a code of procedure for the regulation
of litigation in her courts; and notwithstanding the lamentable confusion and uncertainty.
and the greatly increased expense which has thereby been brought into the administra-
tion of justice in that State, other States have followed in her track of barbaric empiri-
cism. Mr. Justice Grier has, from the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States,
rebuked the folly of abolishing common-law pleading, and substituting the common-
sense practice, as it may be called, in its stead.'" STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINcI-
PLES OF PLEADING, Preface, vii (3d Amer. from 2d London ed. by Tyler, Washington,
D. C., 1895).
22 STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PPJNcIPLES OF PLEADING, Introduction, 23 (3d Am.
ed. by Tyler, Washington, D. C. 1893). See also, HEi[INGWAY, History of Common
Law Pleading as Evidence of the Growth of Industrial Liberty and Power of the
Courts, 5 Ala. L. J. 1 (1929).
23 Apparently the earliest use in America of the phrase "government by law as
opposed to government by man" is found in Part I, art. 30, of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution of 1788.
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tive law, which defines rights and liabilities, and adjective or pro-
cedural law, which furnishes the ways and means of enforcing these
rights and liabilities. In private law, adjective law, in its broadest
aspects and prior to 1848, included (1) Common-Law Pleading; (2)
Equity Pleading; (3) Evidence, and (4) Trial Practice. The position
of common-law pleading in the law will, therefore, appear clearly from
the chart on the next page. As a result of the impact of the New York
Code of Procedure in 1848,24 our modern system of Code Pleading,2
which is a combination of the better elements of the common law and
equity systems of pleading, came into existence.
The influence of this development under the codes finally led,
in 1938, to the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the regula-
tion of practice in the federal courts. Following the example of the
nation some of the states subsequently abandoned their codes in
favor of a system of procedural regulation by rule of court. This
article, however, is concerned primarily with the fundamental prin-
ciples of civil procedure and pleading as developed at common law.
And civil procedure is "the mode of proceeding by which a legal right
is enforced as distinguished from the law which gives or defines the
right."
2 6
2. The Importance of Common-Law Pleading.-To the begin-
ning student or prospective lawyer, an understanding of the funda-
mental principles of common-law pleading and procedure is highly
essential. While the greater portion of our modern law school curricu-
lum is devoted to a consideration of substantive law, the student
should constantly bear in mind that a litigant's substantive rights
ordinarily cannot be effectively sustained except by one adequately
trained in the art and science of procedure, who appreciates the tech-
24 N. Y. Laws 1848, c. 379.
25 "Code Pleading is the term applied to the reformed system of pleading initiated
by the New York Code of 1848 and now in force . . . in American jurisdictions. It is
this latter system which concerns this book. But since it developed from the former
systems [common law and equity] and in many respects continues various details and
parts of them, it is necessary to consider the antecedents in the other systems." CLARK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING, c. I, 4 (2d ed., St. Paul, 1947).
26 Poyser v. Minors, 7 Q. B. Div. 329, 330 (1881), LusH, L. J.
For definition of procedure, compare, GREENIDGE: "Procedure may be defined as a
series of symbolic actions, generally accompanied by words, and, in developed societies,
by the exhibition of written documents, by means of which rights or liberties guaranteed
by a society are reascribed by its individual members. Reassertion is the essence of pro-
cedure; for in the sense in which we use the term-the sense of regaining before a com-
petent court a status that has been lost or questioned-it assumes an already violated
right." GREENIDGE, THE LEGAL PROCEDURE OF CIcERo's TI.E, Introduction, 1 (Ox-
ford, 1901).
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nical steps and maneuvers necessary to present properly his client's
case in court, and how to conduct it to a successful conclusion. A
mere mechanic of the law may get in and out of the court, but often
to the detriment of the client's interest, and in a manner destructive
of the standards of the legal profession. If, however, he desires to
become an artisan of the law, to fully appreciate the significance of
the reformed procedure and the procedural tools used for the protec-
tion of his client's interest, he must understand the fabric of the
common law out of which they have been constructed. In order to
do this he must be conversant with the evolutionary steps which led
up to our modern system of procedure." In short, unless a lawyer
is sufficiently expert in handling the procedural devices available
under the law, any knowledge which he acquires concerning the sub-
stantive law goes for naught. It thus appears that a mastery of ad-
jective law is a prerequisite to a mastery of the law as a whole if a
person hopes to become a successful lawyer. For as Justice Story so
truly said: "No man ever mastered it, [special pleading] who was
not by that means made a profound lawyer."28 It is necessary, there-
fore, that every individual who desires to become a serious student of
the law should have a full appreciation of the importance of common-
law pleading.
In the first place te study of common-law pleading is important
because through its study the student acquires a working apprecia-
tion of the historical development of the law. He comes to realize
the relationship between procedural and substantive law, that right
27 "The importance of a study of common-law pleading rests, first, on the relation-
ship between the modem substantive and ancient remedial law in the scheme of forms of
action; second, the relationship between modern remedial and ancient remedial law;
and, third, the fact that the older cases are expressed in terms of pleading, so that they
cannot be studied understandingly without it. The statutes which seek to abrogate or
simplify common-law pleading'use its terms. In order to understand the progress of the
law, the well-educated lawyer must live through its evolution. Further, in modern
codes the foundation ideas of pleading have not changed." SH'mAN, HANDBOOK OF
COMrMON-LAW PLEADING, 5 (3d ed. by Ballantine, St. Paul, 1923).
See, also, VANDERBILT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL
ADMnISRATION, c. I, Introduction: 1. The Importance of Procedure in the Work of the
Practicing Lawyer and in the Study of Law (New York, 1952).
28 This statement by JusncE STORY was made in "An Address Delivered Before
the Members of the Suffolk Bar, at their anniversary, on the Fourth of September,
1821, at Boston," and is reported in 1 Am. Jur. 1, 28 (1821).
Special pleading, in popular language, refers to the adroit and plausible advocacy
of a client's case in court. But, from the viewpoint of the common law it refers to
pleading by specific allegations as opposed to general allegations. [HEPBURN, THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING, c. III, 65, 66 (Cincinnati, 1897); CLARK, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING, C. I, 13, n. 24 (2d ed. St. Paul, 1927)].
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and remedy are bound together,2" that substantive rights are expressed
in terms of remedial rights and forms of action. In short, it is essen-
tial to realize that the forms of action are, in fact, the categories of
legal liability, and that most of our modern substantive contract, tort
and property law, had its origin in and developed out of procedure.
It was in this very connection that Sir Henry Maine observed that
the rules of substantive law had the appearance of being "secreted in
the interstices of procedure."" ° What Maine was saying was that the
study of the forms of action is one of the richest sources of informa-
tion for a student of legal development and theory, that there can
be no true understanding of the law except as against its historical
background and that this history can only be fully and intelligently
interpreted in the light of the origin and growth of procedure. 31
In the second place a knowledge of common-law procedure is
essential as an aid in understanding the early English and American
decisions in which rulings on the law are only comprehensible to the
modern student in the light of a working knowledge of pleading at
common law. The issues in these early cases, framed at a period of
time when it was not yet certain whether the pleadings should be
English, French, or Latin, and while the pleadings were still in their
developmental stage,32 were necessarily formulated on the basis of the
older system. In consequence, the opinions rendered in these cases
are sometimes in language and phraseology understandable only by
one versed in the common-law system of procedure. Thus, the phrase
"the lessor of the plaintiff" is understandable only in the light of the
fiction in ejectment; the doctrine of quid pro quo has meaning only
to one who has studied the early cases involving debt; and an "exe-
29 MAITLAND clearly had this in mind when, in referring to the dependence of right
upon remedy, as illustrated by the Common Law Forms of Action, he declared: "'The
forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves." TnE FORMS
or ACTIoN AT CoroN LAW, c. I, 2 (Cambridge, 1948).
30 MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOMS, c. XI, 389 (New York, 1886).
But compare the statement of Street, who declared: "To the modem mind no line
of cleavage is more marked than between substantive and adjective law. It was not
always so. The very term 'adjective law' was first used by Bentham. In early stages
of legal growth the two elements are inseparable." 3 FOUNDATIONS or LEGAL LnIAIITY,
c. I, 1 (Northport, 1906).
31 SIR MONTAGUE CRACKENTHORPE, O.C., in an address to the American Bar Associa-
tion, in reference to the utility of the study of common-law pleading, stated: "And, so
long as written pleadings remain, the best masters of the art will be they who can inform
the apparent license of the new system with that spirit of exactness and self-restraint
which flows from a knowledge of the old." Note, Common Law Pleading, 10 Harv.
L. Rev. 238, 239 (1896).
32 For the story of the language of the pleading, see HOLDSWORTrr, IhsToRY or ENG-
LISH LAW (Boston, 1931).
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cuted consideration" is meaningful only against the historical devel-
opment of assumpsit out of the tort action of trespass on the case
super se assumpsit. Moreover, one called upon to consider a decision
in the Year Books33 might be struck by the inclusion of much material
or discussion which had no apparent bearing upon the final result.34
But such inclusion would be clear to one acquainted with the history
of pleading, particularly that stage of it in which the pleadings were
settled in the heat of battle, in the presence of one's adversary, and
by a process of oral altercation in which the litigants, the enrolling
clerks, the lawyers and the judges played leading roles. 3
In the third place, a knowledge of procedural law is an essential
ingredient of the process by which the beginning law student acquires
the technique of analyzing causes of action.3 First, it has value as
an exercise in legal logic, and it serves "to fix the attention, give a
habit of reasoning closely, quicken the apprehension, and invigorate
the understanding. 3 7  These qualities constitute the foundation of
all legal investigation. Second, the shadings between the common-law
forms of action afford the student excellent practice in distinguish-
ing one decision from another. Third, no educational device is com-
parable to a course on common-law pleading for the purpose of teach-
ing the beginner how to brief a case, reduce the controversy to a
single, clear-cut, well-defined issue of fact or of law, determine the
holding of the court and formulate the rule and principle of the de-
cision. In short, it is an excellent device for extracting, like the roots
of an equation, the true points in dispute; it is a time-tested scheme
of matchless precision for separating the issues of fact from the issues
of law, for the purpose of referring the case to the court or the jury.
Finally, it gives the student a valuable insight into the problem of
what constitutes a cause of action, which is a necessary technique
under any system of procedure.
In the fourth place, a knowledge of common-law pleading is
essential to a full and comprehensive understanding of modern plead-
33 WnIED, THE CmHEP SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HSTORY, c. I, 11-12 (Cam-
bridge, 1925).
34 WINFIELD, THE Cmna SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, c. VII, 153-154
(Cambridge, 1925).
35 ODGERS, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE, C. 6, 68 (14th ed. by Lewis
Sturge, London, 1952).
36 For Cooley's full statement see, RELATION OF CommOzO LAW PLEADING TO CODE
PLEADING, C. I, § 8 (III), infra at 45.
37 SIR WILL.Am JONES, PREFATORY DISCOURSES TO THE SPEECHES OF ISAEUS, C. IV,
34 (London, 1784). See, also, WARREN, LAW STUDIES, 1058 (3d ed. London, 1863).
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ing and practice. In making a study of pleading at common law the
student is not dealing with rules which are obsolete and without inti-
mate relation to the existing law. The fundamental principles of
common-law procedure still prevail; only its technical and archaic
characteristics have been abolished by modern codes, practice acts
and rules of court. This is true because code pleading springs from
a common-law ancestry; because codification at best is only partial
in scope, hence the principles of common-law pleading necessarily
remain as the great residuary law from which the gaps in the code
system of procedure have been and will continue to be filled,3 8 and
against the background of which its every provision must be con-
strued and understood. Thus, to give but one example, the code states
that "the complaint must be stated in plain and concise language,"
which calls for explanation or interpretation. Does it .actually mean
what it says or does it mean something else? After full consideration
the courts have found that at common law the declaration, in order
to state a good cause of action, was required to state ultimate facts,
and not evidentiary facts and not conclusions of law, and that the
rule under the statutory provision in question is the same as at com-
mon law.39 The provision, therefore, has no meaning except as con-
strued against its common-law background.
With a statement of the reasons why a knowledge of common-law
pleading is important, in mind, it may next be helpful to consider
the functions of pleading.
3. The Functions of Pleading at Common Law.4o--The prin-
cipal reason why many ordinary controversies are utterly fruitless
and inconclusive is that prior to the discussion there is no ascertain-
ment by the contending parties of the issues at stake. If every dis-
cussion were preceded by a clear-cut settlement of the questions in
dispute, it would not prove difficult to settle the actual differences
between the disputants, and in many instances it would develop that
there was in reality no difference of opinion.4 Pleading, which is a
38 "All those preexisting rules [of pleading, at common law or in equity], which are
not expressly abrogated, and which can be made applicable under the new system [the
Code] remain in force."- SPENCER, J., in Rochester City Bank & Lester v. Suydam, 5
How. Pr. (N. Y.) 216, 219 (1851).
39 Allen & Carpenter v. Patterson, 7 N. Y. 476 (1852).
40 "The function of pleadings then is to ascertain with precision the matters on
which the parties differ and the points on which they agree; and thus to arrive at cer-
tain clear issues on which both parties desire a judicial decision." ODoERS, PRINCIPLES OF
PLEADING AND PRACTICE, C. 6, 67 (14th ed., by Lewis Sturge, London, 1952).
41 S=mrMAN, HANwOOK oF CoMMoN LAW PLEADING, Editor's Introduction, 8 (3d
ed. by Ballantine, St. Paul, 1923).
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statement in a logical, legal form of the facts which constitute the
plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's ground of defense,
42
is designed to prevent the presentation of such fruitless and imma-
terial controversies in courts of law. The functions of pleading, theie-
fore, have been developed with this end in mind.
The first or primary function of pleading is to reduce the con-
troversy between the parties to a single, clear-cut, well-defined issue48
of fact or of law, or, stated in another way, to separate issues of law
from issues of fact 44 so that the issues of law might be decided as far
as possible prior to the trial of the facts. This was made necessary
by the dual character of the common-law tribunal, that is, of the
court, which generally decides questions of law, and the jury, which
generally determines issues of fact. By this process the matters on
which the parties differ and the points on which they agree, are ascer-
tained with precision, and thus the issues over which the parties are
contending are presented for judicial determination. The pleadings
are not, as frequently assumed in popular estimation, an advocate's
address to the judge or jury. On the contrary they are the formal
statements, drawn up by the counsel of the respective parties, of the
plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's defenses. From the clash
of assertions are disclosed the points in controversy, the propositions
affirmed on one side and denied on the other, on which the decision
of the case will turn. Thus, the primary function of pleading, that is,
of defining the issues over which the parties are contending, is
achieved. "The points admitted by either side are thus extracted and
distinguished from those in controversy; other matters though dis-
42 Bocock v. Leet, 210 Ill. App. 402 (1917). For other definitions of the term
"pleading," see Crumleve v. Cronan, 176 Ky. 818, 197 S. W. 498, 503 (1917), in which
HuRT, J., stated: "Pleadings are statements which set out causes of action and grounds
of defence, and make issues in the action which is to be tried;" and Smith v. Jackson-
ville Oil Mill Co., 21 Ga. App. 679, at 679, 94 S. E. 900, at 900 (1918), in which
LUKE, J., declared: "Pleadings are the written allegations of what is affirmed on the
one side or denied on the other, disclosing to the court or jury trying the matter in dis-
pute between the parties."
See, also, the early English case of Read v. Brookman, 3 T. R. 159, 100 Eng. Rep.
509 (1789).
43 "The term, itself, of 'issue' appears as early as the commencement of the Year
Books, that is, in the first year of Edward II (Year Book, 1 Edw. II, 14), and from
the same period, at least, if not an earlier one, the production of the issue has been not
only the constant effort, but the professed aim and object of pleading." SmPHAN, A
TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLEs OF PLEADING IN" C AcTioxs, c. II, 151 (3d Am. ed. by
Tyler, Washington, D. C. 1893); SHnEaParA, HANDBOOK ON COaMMON LAW PLEADING,
Editor's Introduction, 8, n. 17 (3d ed. by Ballantine, St. Paul, 1923).
44 Smirarpm, HANDBOOK or CommzON LAW PLEADING, Editor's Introduction, 8 (3d ed.
by Ballantine, St. Paul, 1923).
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puted, may prove to be immaterial; and thus the litigation is nar-
rowed down to two or three matters which are the real questions in
dispute,"'45 on which the case may be judicially tried in the most ex-
peditious manner.
It is a great benefit to the parties to know exactly what are the
facts remaining in dispute, and what facts the plaintiff must prove to
sustain his cause of action or the defendant to establish his defense.
The question involved may be reduced to an issue of law, in which
case it may be decided by the judge upon argument, or it may involve
a question of fact, in which case, it may involve a lengthy trial by
jury. By separation of questions of law from questions of fact, the
parties may be saved great trouble and expense in procuring evi-
dence of facts which their opponent does not dispute, and the state
may escape the burden and cost of supervising the litigation of im-
material issues.
The second objective of pleading is to reduce questions of fact
to clear-cut issues, by eliminating immaterial and incidental matters,
and narrowing the case to one or more definite propositions on which
the controversy really turns, thus serving as a guide to the court in
rulings upon offers of evidence. As the pleadings define and limit the
proof, so also do they have a bearing upon the admission or rejection
of evidence. Thus, if A brings trespass for assault and battery, B
pleads self-defense, and A denies the striking in self-defense, the issue
presented is: Did B strike in self-defense? Now, if B offers evidence
that he did not strike A, the court is in a position to rule out the offer
of proof, as such offer has no logical tendency to support the defend-
ant's plea that he struck in self-defense.
The third objective of pleading is to notify the parties them-
selves and the tribunal which is to decide between them of the respec-
tive claims, defenses and cross-demands of the adversaries. Some
advocates of reform, irritated by the mischiefs incident to the abuse
of technical rules of pleading, have suggested that the parties to an
action should come into court without any notice as to the complaint
or answer. It is evident, however, that such a system would lead to
fraud, oppression and expense in a civilized state where commercial
transactions are both numerous and complicated. If, then, notice is
45 ODGES, PRINCIpLES OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN CIVIL ACTIONS IN THE HIGH
COURT OF JUSTICE, c. 6, 65 (14th ed., London, 1952).
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essential, does a mere, general notice46 of the plaintiff's cause of
action and the defendant's ground of defense, serve every purpose?
Thus, suppose the plaintiff's declaration reads as follows:
"The plaintiff alleges that the defendant did not pay a bill of
exchange for $50.00," to which the defendant interposes the follow-
ing plea:
"The defendant states that he is not liable on the bill."
From the plaintiff's statement it could not be determined on
the pleadings whether he had a sufficient cause of action or not, and
from the defendant's plea, it could not be determined whether the
defendant denied the acceptance of the bill, or the other legal requis-
ites essential to liability; or, assuming their existence, whether the
defendant intended to set up new matter such as fraud by way of
answer; nor whether the issue was one of law or of fact. In such a
situation every case would have to be considered by a jury in order
to ascertain that there was no fact in dispute. It thus appears that
the evils of giving no notice would exist nevertheless, expense would
be incurred as the parties would have to come to trial prepared to
offer proof on anything relating to the case, although only one matter
was in reality in dispute. It seems evident, therefore, that "the de-
fendant is entitled to know what it is that the plaintiff alleges against
him; the plaintiff, in his turn, is entitled to know what defense will
be raised to his claim."'47 In support of this view is the statement of
Thomas J., in the Illinois case of Cook v. Scott,48 who declared: "The
province of the declaration is to exhibit upon the record the ground
46 Issue pleading, as opposed to notice pleading, prevailed at common law, as the
chief objective of pleading was to reduce the controversy to an issue of fact or of law.
Fact pleading came in with code pleading, which emphasizes the need for an accurate
statement of the facts, while in recent years there has developed what is known as notice
pleading, or merely giving notice to an opponent of the claim which is being asserted.
On issue and fact pleading, see CLARE, HANDBOOx OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING, C. I,
§§ 11, 56-57 (2d ed. St. Paul, 1947); MILLAR, Notabilia of American Procedure 1887-
1937, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1017, 1034 (1942). For a detailed discussion of notice pleading,
see article by WrrrIER, Notice Pleading, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 501 (1918). And for a
suggestion as to how to resolve the conffict between the various views, see article by
SIMPSON, A Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 169, 187-189
(1939).
See, also, on notice pleading, the First Report of her Majesty's Commissioners for
Inquiring into the Process, Practice and Systems of Pleading in the Superior Court of
Common Law (1851), 11-14, reported in REPPY, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE,
c. I, § 3, 33 (Buffalo, 1954).
47 ODGERS, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE, c. 6, 65 (14th ed. by Lewis
Sturge, London, 1952).
48 1 Gilman (I1.) 333 (1844). See, also, Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. People, 149 Ill. 663,
36 N. E. 989 (1894).
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of the plaintiff's cause of action, as well as for the purpose of notify-
ing the defendant of the precise character of those grounds as of
regulating his own proofs."
The fourth function of pleadings is to serve as an index to the
respective counsel as to the points to be proved at the trial in sup-
port of the contentions of their respective clients and in apportioning
the burden of proof and rebuttal as between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant.49 Thus, if A alleges that B stole his horse, and B denies the
allegation, A knows that he may support his general allegation by
proof that B took any horse, whereas if A had named a black horse,
with a white, forefront foot, he would have been limited to proof of
that particular horse, while B's defense would be simplified by being
limited to defense against taking one specific horse, whereas before
he was under necessity of being prepared to defend a charge of taking
any horse. And it follows logically that the burden of proof would
fall on A as he has affirmed that B took his horse.
The fiftk purpose of pleading is to serve as a formal basis for
the judgment. Beginning with the original writ, let us suppose there
is a charge therein that B is indebted to A in the sum of five hundred
dollars. The declaration must contain the same charge in elaborated
and consistent form, the proof at the trial must correspond to the
charge in the original writ and declaration, the verdict must be found
in accord with the same charge, and finally the judgment on the ver-
dict must be made subject to the same limitations, in order to be free
from attack as going beyond the scope of the pleadings. By this re-
quirement of correspondence between the various pleadings at each
49 BALLAxTiaE, The Need of Pleading Reform in Illinois, 1 U. of Ill. L. Bul. No. 1,
14-16 (1917).
The Massachusetts commissioners of 1851 state the purposes of civil pleading as
follows: "(1) that each party may be under the most effectual influences, which the
nature of the case admits of, so far as he admits or denies anything, to tell the truth,
(2) That each party may have notice of what is to be tried, so that he may come
prepared with the necessary proof, and may save the expense and trouble of what is
not necessary. (3) That the court may know what the subject matter of the dispute is,
and what is asserted or denied concerning it, so that it may restrict the debate within
just limitations and discern what rules of law are applicable. (4) That it may ever after
appear what subject matter was then adjudicated, so that no further or other dispute
should be permitted to arise concerning it." 6 Mass. L. Q. 104 (1921); HAiL'S MASSA-
cHusans PRAciC (Boston, 1851).
As to functions of criminal pleading and the certainty and precision required, see
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875); MILLAR, The Reform
of Criminal Pleading in Illinois, 8 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology, 337-361 (1917);
Mmrx.A, The Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 11 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Crim-
inology, 344-367 (1920).
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stage of the proceedings the common law secured in pleadings what
we refer to in English composition as unity, coherence and emphasis.
The sixth and final function of pleading is to preserve a record
of the controversy litigated, which serves as a foundation for a plea
of res judicata, which, if sustained, operates to prevent the relitiga-
tion of the same controversy, provided it involves the same parties
and the same subject matter. Thus, in the early New York case of
Farrington v. Payne,5° where A sued B for the conversion of three
bed quilts,--a bed and three bed quilts having been taken away-
and recovered, after which he brought a second action for conversion
of the bed, to which B pleaded former recovery for the same act and
subject matter, it was held by the court that the judgment in the first
suit was a bar to the plaintiff's second action. And this same rule
applies under the reformed procedure in the same manner as at com-
mon law.5'
The claim of the law of pleading to be a science must, therefore,
be measured by the extent of its adaptation of its rules to the accom-
plishment of its main functions, that is, fair notice to the parties and
50 15 Johns. 432 (N. Y. 1818).
51 In Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N. Y. 548, 554 (1858), decided under the Code, STRONG, J.,
says: "The principle is settled beyond dispute that a judgment concludes the right of
ihe parties in respect to the cause of action stated in the pleadings on which it is ren-
dered, whether the suit embraces the whole or only part of the demand constituting the
cause of action. It results from this principle, and the rule is fully established, that
an entire claim, arising either upon a contract or from a wrong, cannot be divided and
made the subject of several suits; and if several suits be brought for different parts of
such a claim, the pendency of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and
a judgment upon the merits in either will be available as a bar in the other suits. (Far-
rington v. Payne, 15 Johns. 432; . . . Philips v. Berick, 16 id. 137; . . . Guernsey v.
Carver, 8 id. 492; Stevens v. Lockwood, 13 id. 644 . . . ). But it is entire claims only,
which cannot be divided within this rule, those which are single and individual in their
nature. The cause of action in the different suits must be the same. The rule does not
prevent, nor is there any principle which precludes the prosecution of several actions
upon several causes of action. The holder of several promissory notes may maintain an
action on each; a party upon whose person or property successive distinct trespasses
have been committed may bring a separate suit for every trespass; and all demands, of
whatever nature, arising out of separate and distinct transactions, may be sued upon
separately. It makes no difference that the causes of action might be united in a single
suit; the right of the party in whose favor they exist to separate suits is not affected
by that circumstance, except that in proper cases, for the prevention of vexation and
oppression, the court will enforce a consolidation of the actions."
In general, on the splitting of causes of action see
Articles: CLINEBURO, SPrTTING CAUSE or AcTION, 19 Neb. L. Bull. 156 (1940); Mc-
NIsH, JOINDER AND SPLITTING OF CAUSES Or ACTION IN NEBRASKA, 26 Neb. L. Rev. 42
(1946); COLVIN, INJURIES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY-ONE ACTION OR Two, 2 Ala. L.
Rev. 75 (1949).
Note: Pleading-Splitting Causes of Action-Counterclaim in Court of Limited
Jurisdiction, 36 Yale L. J. 883 (1927).
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the accurate, practical and systematic presentation of the precise ques-
tions of law and fact involved to the tribunal which is to decide them.
The various and possible functions of pleading may therefore be enu-
merated as follows:
(1) To reduce the controversy between the parties to a single-
clear-cut well-defined issue of fact or of law, or to separate issues of
law from issues of fact, so that the issues of law may be determined
as far as possible in advance of the trial of the facts;
(2) To reduce questions of fact to clear-cut issues by elimi-
nating immaterial and incidental matters, and narrowing the case to
one of more specific propositions on which the controversy really
turns, thus operating as an aid to the court in admitting or rejecting
offers of evidence;
(3) To notify the parties themselves and the deciding tribunal
of the respective claims, defenses and counter-demands of the ad-
versaries;
(4) To serve as an index to the respective counsel as to the
points to be proved at the trial and as a guide to the court in ap-
portioning the burden of proof and rebuttal as between the plaintiff
and defendant;
(5) To serve as a formal basis for the judgment;
(6) To preserve a record of the controversy litigated and to
create a foundation for a plea of res judicata, thus preventing a
relitigation of the same controversy between the same parties at a
later date.
It thus becomes clear that historically, the principal purpose of
the rules of pleading has been to compel each person to state the
essential elements of his claim or defense in order to arrive at an
issue. It has not always been true that common-law pleading has
accomplished the objective of reducing all cases to definite issues, this
end being defeated on occasion by resort to technical procedural de-
vices which had outgrown their days of usefulness 2 But in both
common-law and code pleading, the issue-raising function far over-
shadows the notice-giving one, and is the source of the principal rules
qf pleading. It is so under the modern English pleading. The case
must be analyzed and reduced to issues at the trial, if not before, and
52 W TiER, Judge Gilbert and Illinois Pleading Reform, 4 III. L. Rev. 174, 176-178
(1910).
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it is inexpedient to postpone this essential preliminary to the day
of trial.
4. The Development of Substantive Law Out of Procedure.-
Under Anglo-American law, the substantive law defines rights, and
liabilities and the procedural law furnishes the ways and means of en-
forcing those rights and liabilities. But in what order did this develop-
ment take place? Were rights and liabilities first defined and there-
after courts established to enforce those rights and liabilities, or
were courts first set up and thereafter rights and liabilities defined?
This question, if asked of a beginning student of the law, will in-
variably be answered by a statement that rights and liabilities would
first be defined, with the courts to enforce them to be established
thereafter.53
In fact the law grew up in exactly the opposite way, courts being
organized to handle a series of specific cases, the decision of which
gradually developed theories of rights and liabilities. In short, our
rights and liabilities as defined by substantive law, had their origin
in and developed out of procedural law. If this be true, how did it
come about? Let us assume that A and B are shipwrecked and land on
the proverbial uninhabited, deserted island. A, quickly recovering
from the shock, shakes the water off, works his way up to a nearby
knoll, where the ground is level and the view good, and says: "I
like this place; I think I shall take possession." Who owns that
knoll? A owns it by reason of having first acquired possession, by
reason of his strong right arm. As a result he may also be said to
have acquired a moral but not a legal right to retain possession.
Some time later, B pulls himself together, and discovers A on the
knoll. Arriving there, he surveys the prospect with satisfaction equal
to that of A, and then after pondering over the situation, declares:
"I like this knoll too; I think I shall take it." "Oh, no you won't,"
exclaims A; "This knoll belongs to me." "Oh, yes I will," retorts B.
"Oh, no you won't" bristles A, whereupon B, abandoning further
argument strikes A over the head with a club, and takes possession.
Now, who owns the knoll? B. By what right? Not by a moral right,
as A preceded him in possession in point of time; not by a legal right,
because in the absence of a court in which a remedy could be sought,
53 "A system of laws promulgated by a law given of sufficient wisdom and illimita-
ble foresight would ultimately commence with a definition of rights and thence proceed
to prescribe duties, thence to prohibit wrongs, and finally to provide legal remedies."
ROBINSON, ELEmFNTS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, c. 5, § 5, 155 (Boston, 1900).
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no such right yet existed. In reality B now owns the knoll by right
of the strong arm; by right of might, that being at the moment the
only law in effect on the island.
Without going into the evolutionary developments involved, let
us say that time moves on, and later we find that other members
have joined the society of A and B-men, women, and children.
After this development, C hits D over the head with a club; the blow
glances off D's head and strikes E, the child of a third party. Im-
mediately there is great excitement in the community. The people
crowd together, and someone is heard to say: "As long as A and B
were the only inhabitants on this island, this business of their hitting
one another over the head was their own affair; but now that there
are others here, we must do something to control such actions." But
"What can we do" exclaimed the others! At this point someone
suggested that the group should select a leader, hail the individuals
before that leader, who would then hear both sides of the controversy
and render a decision. Accordingly, the group chose its fastest runner,
its wisest counselor, its best medicine man, its most esteemed religious
adviser, or its greatest military leader, escorted him to the edge of the
forest, and set him up on a stump to decide the controversy. Thus, was
the court or tribunal created; thus, did the group take its first step in
the development of the law; thus, did it prepare the way for transform-
ing moral into legal rights.. Then the group took C, D and E before
the newly created tribunal. In turn D and E were required to tell
their story, and C was permitted to present his side. Before any
decision was rendered the most that could be said in favor of D and E
was that in the view of the group, their moral right not to be inter-
fered with had been violated; as yet they had no legal rights as they
were still without a remedy. After hearing both sides of the con-
troversy, let us assume that the court, presided over by the chosen
leader, who has now become a judge, fines C twenty hides, ten hides
to go to the injured parties, ten hides to go to the community. At
the moment of decision, D and E for the first time had acquired a
legal right not to be struck, the moral right having been changed into
a legal right through the acquisition of a legal remedy. Let us now
assume further that after two or three similar episodes of this kind,
in which the B's and C's were fined for having struck someone, the
wiser members of the group, while wending their way home from the
court, began to reason somewhat as follows: If, when B strikes A
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over the head with a club, he is hailed before a court and punished,
it must be because A had a right not to be struck; if A has such a
right, then B must be under a duty not to violate it; if B does violate
A's right not to be struck and his own duty not to strike, B commits
a wrong for which he may be held liable. Thus, the concepts of right
and duty,54 of wrong and liability, are merely different sides of the
same shield. If the rights violated involved a breach of duty to
the community or state, the accused was said to be guilty of a criminal
wrong, whereas if the rights violated were concerned with similar
breaches of duties as between individuals of the group or society,
the accused were said to be guilty of a civil wrong. But at this stage
of the discussion, the important point to be observed in the foregoing
account is that these primitive legal concepts of right, duty, wrong
and liability, had their origin in and developed out of procedure,
that is, out of the process by which a myriad of single instances, of
specific factual situations, were presented to and decided by a court;
that the substantive law right of A, D and E not to be struck, came
into existence only upon the pronouncement of judgment by the
tribunal.
This process not only produced a body of substantive contract,
property and tort law but it also exercised, as we shall see, a pro-
found effect upon the form of our judicial organization, which in turn
developed the five great systems of administrative, admiralty, com-
mon, equity and probate law.
But as our modem codes of civil procedure have been patterned
in some respects after the modes of procedure in equity, which in
turn, were influenced by the civil law of Rome, it might be useful to
trace in broad outline some of the principal features of Roman civil
procedure, in order to furnish the student with an apperceptive back-
ground against which the adjective common law may be compared.
5. The Roman System of Civil Procedure.---The civil law of
54 See LANGDELL, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1887).
55 In general, on the Roman System of civil procedure, see:
Treatises: GAis, INsTrruTs OF, aD RuLns oF ULPx=a (New York, 1880); ENoars-
mr, DER RoamscHE CrV.PROGRESS (Brelau, 1891); GREENIrGE, TnE LEoAL. PROCEDURE
or CicERo's Tiar, Introduction, 1 (Oxford, 1901); Somt, Tim INsrl"UT., c. 224-301
(Tr. by Ledlie, 3d ed. Oxford, 1907); BucxLANo, A TExT-Boox oN RoMAN LAW, c.
XIII, The Law of Procedure. Legis Actio Formulo Cognito, 599-667 (Cambridge, 1921);
BUCKLAND AND McNsA3, RoxAN LAW AND CoMMox LAW, c. XII, Procedure, 398-423
(2d ed. by Lawson, Cambridge, 1952).
Articles: ScRuTTozr, ROmAN LAw IwhuErE 3N CHANCERY, CnrnEcE COURTS, AD-
MIRA.LTY AND LAW MERcamT, 1 SEL=E EssAYs iN ANGLO-A RiCAl LEoAL, H1ISToY, Bk.
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ancient Roman and the common law of England constitute the two
great rival world systems of law. For purposes of comparison the stu-
dent should have some knowledge of their differences and similari-
ties. Roman law, expanding with the empire, was one of the princi-
pal devices by which Roman imperial authority was maintained. It
is no surprise, therefore, to learn that the legal history of Rome,
like its political history, was separated into three periods :56
The Period of the Kings.-In this period, also known as the
period of the legis actio procedure, which was characterized by great
formality, according to Professor Samuel Tyler, the administration
of justice was largely a matter of royal discretion, cases being de-
cided on a basis of abstract justice. The procedure, like that of most
primitive societies, was characterized by the development of forms
of action-five in number.5 7 If a plaintiff wished to secure relief
for an alleged wrong, he was required to bring his claim within the
scope of one of the established forms of action. The issue in each case
was formulated in advance of the trial, being framed before the prae-
tor, who extracted it from the plaintiff's and defendant's statements,
and conducted the proceedings to a point where they were in shape for
a final decision, whereupon the praetor referred them to a judex, a pri-
vate person selected for a specific case by the parties themselves,5"
whose function it was to investigate the facts and pronounce judg-
ment upon the issue. It thus appears that the Roman system of pro-
cedure at this stage was analogous to the common law system at
relatively the same stage of development, that is, both systems de-
veloped forms of action which came to be the test of substantive rights,
and both systems framed the issue in advance of trial, the issue under
the Roman system being framed by the praetor and then referred to
the judex for trial, while the issue under the common law system was
framed by the pleadings, and then referred to the jury for trial. At
I, Pt. 11, 7, 208 (Boston, 1907) ; KocouREx, The Formulary Procedure of Roman Law,
8 Va. L. Rev. 337-359, 434-444 (1922); DORSEY, Manifestations of Roman Procedure,
9 Am. L. School Rev. 1482 (1943).
56 See STEPH , A TREATISE ON THE PRImCiPLES OF PLEADmNG n Civ AcroNs,
Introduction, 2 (3d Am. ed. by Tyler, Washington, D. C. 1893).
57 Gaius tells us "that the legis actiones were five in number, each taking its name
from its special characteristic feature, viz., (1) the legis actio per sacramentum, (2) that
fer judicis postutationem, (3) that per condictionem, (4) that per manus injectionem,
and (5) that per pignoris capionem." MansHEAD, HIsTORcAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PR-
vATE LAW or Ronmm, c. IV, § 33, 182 (Edinburgh, 1886).
58 STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRwciPLs OF PLEADING, Introduction, 2 (3d Am.
ed. by Tyler, Washington, D. C. 1893).
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this point, however, the analogy ceases, as at common law the issue
resulted from alternate pleadings or by acts of the parties, whereas,
-under the civil law, the issue was extracted and formulated by the
praetor or other magistrate from the statements, as opposed to. the
pleadings of the parties-a fundamental distinction, the significance
of which will appear later.
The Period of the Republic.-Into the early part of this second
period, which was also known as the period of formulary procedure,
the legis actio procedure of the first period, was extended. But, ob-
serves Professor Tyler, gradually the administration of justice passed
from royal hands into the control of the consuls, praetors and inferior
magistrates. As we saw in the first period, so in this period, the judi-
cial reference of the issue is framed by the praetor and as directed to
the judex was known as an edict. This edict contained, according to
a certain formula, a statement of the facts in dispute, the general
rules applicable thereto, with instructions to the judex to see that his
decision and the facts as he found them were in conformity. In time
these oral formulae of the legis actio procedure became inadequate
to meet the needs of an expanding empire. In other words, under the
praetor and his jurisdiction, using the old forms of action of the
twelve tables, which procedure extended into the early part of the
period of the republic, every suitor was required to bring his suit
within the limitations of a specific form of action; failing to do so, he
was without remedy, however just his complaint. But as the nation
grew the old forms of action were in practical effect abolished, and
legal remedies, freed from their restrictive influence, were enlarged.
In consequence, the praetor urbanus acquired authority to make new
rules and frame new orders to fit special cases. So, when a complaint
was made which was not covered by the old forms of action, the
praetor could, upon a statement of facts, allow the complainant an
action, place the facts and issue in a new formula, and then turn the
matter over to the judex. By this process new remedies enforcing
claims not before cognizable under the law grew up, with the result-
ant establishment of new rules of substantive law to meet the ex-
panding needs of a rapidly growing empire; and by analogy, in very
much the same manner in which the action of Trespass on the Case,
as the great residuary remedy of the common law, was used to ex-
pand remedial relief in all cases similar to but not quite identical
with trespass. And as the new remedies were required to observe
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the form of the old, progress and the Roman conception of conserva-
tism were brought into conformity, marching forward hand in hand,
and converting customs and new commercial practices into substan-
tive law.
As each praetor took office he published an edict setting forth
the principles upon which he intended to administer justice. By such
declaration, known as a continuous edict, the praetor gave the appear-
ance to the litigants of acting under a set of pre-established general
rules, influenced by the special interests of a specific case. Where
a case did not fall within the scope of a continuous edict, special
edicts were framed by the praetor. In practice these continuous edicts
prevailed for but one year, but as succeeding praetors adopted the
rules declared by their predecessors, there gradually developed a body
of edictal law, which, when once established, had the same authori-
tative effect as if it had been enacted by a legislature. When new
usages and customs grew up they found expression in the edicts, which
in effect constituted the purest sort of legislation.
And the edictal direction was not the only mode of action avail-
able to the praetor; he might order specific relief, such as restitution
of a specific thing, or he might by interdict enjoin certain things from
being done, either in a preliminary or final proceeding.
Because of Rome's relation to foreign states, Roman law also
underwent development in a different direction. In the case of states
with whom she had treaties, it became necessary to give their citi-
zens, who were aliens under the Roman law, certain civil rights such
as the right to hold property within the Roman empire. For this pur-
pose, by 247 B.C., a magistrate known as praetor peregrinus, was an-
nually elected, and given the necessary jurisdiction. In these cases
both parties were not Roman citizens, and the transactions entered
into were not made with reference to Roman law, hence the praetor
had to apply principles common to all systems of law, thus giving
the Roman magistrates a practical acquaintance with the laws of for-
eign states, which in time, came to be recognized as a law of na-
tions; which in time, became part of the civil law of Rome. In con-
sequence the rights and obligations of foreigners, as well as those
of Roman citizens, were judicially enforced. And from the law of
nations, if we may believe the Roman jurists, came the law of con-
tracts, sales, loans, bailments, partnership, and the law of slavery
insofar as it established the right of property in man.
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The development of both procedural and substantive law by ju-
dicial decision resulted in great confusion, as the body of the law
became unwieldy. Moreover, as one praetor was not bound by the
decisions of his predecessors, there was little in the nature of fixed
principles of law. In this situation a class of men known as Roman
jurists arose during the time of Cicero, Quintus Mucius Scaevola be-
ing the first, and Servius Sulpicius being the second. They were not
mere practicing lawyers, whose function it was to give legal advice
and draft documents in legal form, but who were not permitted to
conduct cases before a court. This was the function of the jurists in
both civil and criminal cases, as well as to appear in the senate and
before great assemblies. The jurists occasionally appeared in public
at certain places, for the purpose of giving oral advice to those who
sought it. They also opened their homes for the same purpose. Young
men, seeking a knowledge of law, were permitted to be present to
hear the advice given and to observe the mode in which the business
was transacted. Thus, for example, Cicero became a student of Scae-
vola.
During this period Roman law underwent great expansion on
both the procedural and substantive law sides. On the procedural
side the chief point of interest to be observed is that under the for-
mulary procedure which succeeded the legis actio procedure, the earli-
er practice of the praetor in extracting the issue from the statement of
the parties was gradually abandoned in favor of the less restricted
formulary system, which was adaptable to new and widely varied
claims, drawn up by the praetor or magistrate and accepted by the
parties, which latter practice by statute gradually became the accept-
ed mode of framing issues, in much the same way the parties framed
issues at common law. Kocourek, a distinguished authority on juris-
prudence, criticizes this practice, stating that: "A disputed matter of
fact or law or of both, cannot be resolved into simple, ultimate ques-
tions of the merits of a controversy by any system of procedure which
leaves the formulation of these issues to the adversaries them-
selves."
59
The Period Under the Emperors.-According to Professor Tyler
it was during this period, which was known as the Libellary Period of
Procedure, after the glory of the Republic had vanished, that the jur-




ists became the great architects of the Roman system of law. The
power of the praetor was limited and Augustus Caesar, representing
the imperial favor, took over the functions of developing the law,
giving to certain jurists the privilege of giving opinions in cases re-
ferred to them by the judex; if the jurists agreed unanimously, the
judex was bound to follow their opinion; if not, he was free to adopt
the opinions which seemed applicable to him. Under this arrange-
ment both the praetor and judex acted merely as ministerial officers,
and in time the two earlier stages of procedure before these officials
were abandoned in favor of a trial before a magistrate, without the
formality of developing an issue, but with a brief statement of the
ground of suit. During the reign of Tiberius Caesar, the opinions of
certain jurists were authenticated under his seal, and thus became
law. These jurists, whose unanimous opinion made law, became an
established institution. Some of these men advised the emperors as
to legislation, and as to other matters of law submitted to them di-
rectly or by appeal. Septimus Severus, utilizing his authority to sub-
ordinate the civil to the military power, appointed Papinian, the great-
est of all Roman jurists, as praetorian prefect-which gave him power
over both the army and the law, and he, in turn, was succeeded by
Ulpian and Paulus. These jurists wrote authoritative treatises on the
law, which came to have as much weight as authority as their
opinions, which were ultimately responsible for the systematization
of Roman jurisprudence. Utilizing the law contained in the twelve
tables, the edictal law and established custom, they devoted them-
selves to building up the law to such an extent and so effectively that
the writings of Papinian, Paulus, Gaius, Ulpian and Modestinus, were
by imperial fiat declared to have the force of law, when they were
unanimous; if not unanimous, the majority opinion was to prevail;
if equally divided, the opinion with which Papinian concurred was to
be adopted. Thus, through the efforts of the first two great praetors,
and through the writings of the great jurists, there emerged from the
narrow rules which developed out of the early peculiarities of Roman
society, a system of broad general principles which gradually expand-
ed into a system of justice designed for universal dominion, and to
serve as the common law of all the provinces.
The jurists, being imperialists, by their opinions supported "the
imperial authority at all points of doctrinal application and adminis-
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trative contact between it and the law."6" Remembering the republic
and the right of revolution, these jurists sought to justify the Roman
Emperor on some legal theory-to wit, that the authority of the
people had been irrevocably granted to the emperor, which was com-
pared with the constitutional principle that whatever pleased the
prince had the force of law. In this way, the jurisprudence which had
been recast in an imperial mold became a part of the imperial system.
And the chief governmental officers of the empire were selected from
the legal profession, they were indoctrinated with the principles of im-
perial policy, with the result that both the courts and the law were
subordinated to imperial authority, thus paving the way for a perfect
system of despotism disguised under the forms of law, and built up on
the ruins of the republic. The open courts of the republic in both
civil and criminal cases disappeared, and appeal lay only to the em-
peror.
After the division of the empire, Justinian, the Emperor, had all
the constitutions which had been issued by the preceding rulers, or-
ganized into a code. Tribonian, a distinguished lawyer and one of the
codifiers, was placed at the head of a commission, to make selec-
tions from the writings of the elder jurists, which selections were to
serve as a compendious exposition of Roman law. After three years of
labor this commission produced what are now known as the Pandects
or Digest, containing literal extracts from thirty-nine jurists, but with
the extracts from Ulpian and Paulus constituting about one half of
the entire work. The Pandects were not only used by the practition-
ers, but were also designed to serve the purposes of legal education
in the schools of jurisprudence at Constantinople and Berytus. Tri-
bonian and Theophilus having been appointed as professors of law
in these schools, produced the Institutes.
Thus, the Code, the Pandects or Digest and the Institutes came
to contain the civil law which has been handed down to modern times,
and it was this system which has been generally adopted and fol-
lowed in the continental countries; it was also this system which,
through the church, had its effect on the ecclesiastical law and on the
development of equity in England. The latter developments in Roman
law, therefore, exerted a greater influence upon our modern systems of
law than the developments in the two earlier periods of Roman legal
developments.
60 See STEPHim, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS,
Introduction, 8 (3d Am. ed. by Tyler, Washington, D. C. 1893).
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It should be observed in retrospect says Professor Tyler, that
Roman jurisprudence underwent several stages of development. Under
Augustus two schools of reformers appeared, one in favor of adher-
ing to the strict forms of the law under the republic, the other, in
favor of substituting for them simple and general forms, better ac-
commodated to the larger equity required by the enlightened spirit of
the age. Labeo stood at the head of the Republican school, Capito
at the head of the other. Capito, a time-server of the new order, ad-
vocated a change in both the forms and the spirit of legal procedure,
whereas Labeo, favored adherence to the technical forms of procedure,
believing that they alone guaranteed the protection of the rights of
the citizen. This struggle continued for a full century, with the im-
perial party gradually gaining the upper hand, until, under Emperor
Hadrian, by the use of the imperial edict, the reforming element
acquired "uncontrolled legislative authority, and fixed forever the
character of the imperial jurisprudence." 61 From this time on, the
civil law and its procedure conformed to the praetorian form and
spirit which had found ultimate expression in the Code, the Pandects
and the Institutes of Justinian. The early forms of procedure of the
republic, which emanated from the free spirit of the people, were now
replaced by what appeared to be the simpler forms of procedure under
the empire, thus making a so-called advance in Roman jurisprudence.
In reality, however, the substance was exchanged for the form; the
machinery for carrying the law into effect was confounded with the
law itself. The substantive law was undoubtedly improved, but the
mode of procedure for enforcing the rights and liabilities thereunder
"was changed from one suited to the liberty of the citizen to one
suited to arbitrary power, by enlarging the discretion of judges.1 62
And it was this very development which explains why the countries
of continental Europe have been governed by one tyranny after an-
other, whereas, in England, where the judges were controlled by the
law, and not left free to exercise their personal whims under the guise
of legal discretion, the people have continually enjoyed a larger de-
gree of freedom.
6. The Continental Syster of Civil Procedure.G--By the latter
61 See STEPHE, A TRE.ATISE ON Tm PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN Civm ACTIONS,
Introduction, 10 (3d Am. ed. by Tyler, Washington, D. C. 1893).
62 Ibid.
63 In general, on the continental system of civil procedure, see:
TREATISES: Mxr AR, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, Vol. 7 (1927)
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part of the Period Under the Emperors, the Roman law had assumed
a definite form in the Codes, the Pandects and the Institutes. These
contained the civil law which was handed down to modern times, and
it was this system of civil law which has been adopted in Continental
Europe. In recent years, through the research efforts of a distin-
guished group of legal scholars, among whom Professor Robert W.
Millar 64 is preeminent, we have learned some of the points of distinc-
tion between the continental and common law systems, particularly
on the procedural side. The pleadings at common law, once oral, are
now entirely written, whereas, although the early steps in continental
pleading, such as the statement of the parties, and the grounds of
demand, were written, the real pleadings, that is, those conducted be-
fore the open court, took the form of oral conclusions. One reason
why so little emphasis is placed on written pleadings under the con-
tinental system of procedure may be due to the absence of trial by
jury, which is one of the chief characteristics of the common-law
system. Under such a system in which, as Professor Charles E. Clark
accurately observes, little importance is attached to the "unfamiliar
statements of the parties,"65 it is understandable why decisions on
points of pleading are infrequent.
7. The Civil and Common-Law Systems of Pleading Compared.
-The Civil Law of ancient Rome and the Common Law of England,
the two great systems which have significantly influenced modern
civilization, have much in common, yet differ in certain fundamental
respects. The common law differed from the Roman law with respect
of the Continental Legal History Series, containing a rich source of continental legal
materials.
Articles: CLARx, S. S., Individualism and Legal Procedure, 14 Yale L. J. 263 (1905);
BtDnwIn, The German Law-Suit Without Lawyers, 8 Mich. L. Rev. 30 (1909); LzVwn-
s=, Courts and Procedure in Germany, 5 111. L. Rev. 193 (1910); BORCHMD, Some Les-
sons from the Civil Law, 64 U; of Pa. L. Rev. 570, 578 (1916); Mimn, The Formative
Principles of Civil Procedure, 18 Ili. L. Rev. 1, 94, 150 (1923); MIL, The Recent Re-
forms in German Civil Procedure, 10 A. B. A. J. 703 (1924); MMLA, Some Aspects of
Civil Pleading Under Anglo-American and Continental Systems, 12 A. B. A. J. 401
(1926); LE PAuLLE, Study in Comparative Civil Procedure, 12 Cornell L. Q. 24 (1926);
WRIGHT, French and English Procedure: A Parallel, 42 L. Q. Rev. 327 (1926); DE-
oER, Recent French Decrees, Modification of Procedure, 18 J. Comp. Leg. & Int. L.
236 (1936); LowENsLEmf, Law in the Third Reich, 45 Yale L. J. 779, 789 (1936); COHN,
New Regulations in the German Code of Civil Procedure, 17 J. Comp. Leg. & Int. L. 72
(1935); SHATEI. Am Woix, Civil Justice in Germany, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 863 (1944).
64 Mum, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure, 18 IEI. L. Rev. 1, 94, 150
(1923).




to administrative principles and forms of procedure. The principle
which distinguishes the two systems is the relative obligatory force
which is given under them to precedent or to former decisions. The
former decision binds the common law court unconditionally on the
same state of facts, it being deemed essential to follow a fixed rule
of decision, in order to protect rights and property, and in order that
a lawyer may, with some degree of accuracy, advise his client as to
the state of the law. Under the civil law a prior decision has no fixed
or binding operation; it merely governs the particular case and does
not establish as a rule of law the principle developed therein. As the
judge decides the case according to his own personal conception of
justice, or that of some eminent jurist, in practical administration the
civil law suffers from the uncertainty and fluctuation of doctrine
which inevitably results from a failure to follow precedent. By con-
trast the only authority recognized at common law consists of the
judgments of courts deliberately given in cases argued by the counsel
of both parties and then decided by the judges, after the reading of
briefs and extended discussion of the issues among themselves. Ac-
cording to Lord Coke, 6 the lawyer's opinion has no place in inter-
preting either common law or statute; only "the solemn voice of the
law itself, speaking through its constituted tribunals, is of any judicial
authority."67 And it was this very stability of law, overriding the
prerogatives of the English Crown, and thus making possible the
rendition of justice to the high and the low, the rich and the poor,
over a period of six hundred years, that has vindicated the "frame
and ordinary course of the common law,"68 and recommended its con-
sideration to succeeding generations of free men.
The great superiority of the common over the civil law as a prac-
tical system of jurisprudence regulating the affairs of society is there-
fore due to the certainty as to rights and obligations which it guaran-
tees, thus excluding private interpretations and administering a curb
to the arbitrary discretion of judges. Fixed and certain principles of
interpretation, early adopted, have never been abandoned, but have
continued as precedents under which cases based on an identical fac-
tual situation are decided in the same way. Under the civil law, it
is otherwise. In modem times the historical and philosophical schools
66 See 9th Report, Preface (Dublin, 1792).
67 STm N, A TREATISE ON ME PRMCIPLES oF PLEADING N Cxrvn AcTiONs, Intro-
duction, 13 (3d Am. ed. by Tyler, Washington, D. C. 1893).
68 Id. at 14.
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of thought have introduced different principles of interpretation,
which, when supported by the idea that former decisions are of no
weight, has produced such uncertainty that a decision in the clearest
case cannot be confidently forecast.
The difference between the administrative principles of the civil
and common law is directly related to their different modes of pro-
cedure and with the different degree of respect paid to technical
forms. When we come to trace the development of the common-law
forms of actions we shall find that they were long regarded as being
as sacred as the principles which they embodied. The right depended
.on the form and the form, being itself a precedent, made certain and
fixed the principle which it embodied.
Special pleading was the great instrument by which the common
law secured certainty in precedent, it being "the mainspring and regu-
lative force of the whole [procedural] machinery of the common
law" 9 by which every step in pleading, from the original writ to the
final judgment, follows in logical and undeviating form and sequence,
serving to give to the judgment of the court and the opinions of the
judges, a very high degree of certainty as to the points of law in-
volved, and to preserve a record of them as precedents for the guid-
ance of future generations of clients, lawyers and judges.
As previously observed one of the functions of judicial procedure
is to ascertain and to decide the issues of law or of fact in dispute
between the parties. The modes for realizing upon this function of
pleading were different under the common and civil law. Without the
necessity of any participation by the court, the system of pleading as
-developed at common law was designed to produce the issues in dis-
pute upon the common-law record, the parties being required to plead
alternatively in writing until one side or the other demurred, thus
raising an issue of law to be tried by the court, or entered a denial of
the opposing allegations, thus raising an issue of fact to be tried by
a jury, and terminating the pleading in one or the other event. Under
the civil law mode of procedure, the parties are not required to de-
velop upon the written record, by a process of alternate pleading, the
issues of law or of fact in controversy. Contrary to the common-law
rule they are permitted to set forth at large all the facts-ultimate
facts, evidentiary facts, and even conclusions of law-which consti-
tute the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's ground of de-
69 Id. at 15.
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fense, and without bothering to separate the issues of law from the
issues of fact, as is required at common law. This practice arises
out of the fact that the chancery or equity court is not dual in charac-
ter, but consists of a single judge, generally unassisted by a jury, who
is trained as a lawyer, and hence is able, unlike the jurors, to handle
both separated and complicated issues of fact and of law. The entire
case is thus "presented in gross to the court for its determination,'1 7
leaving to it the laborious task of extracting from the complex alle-
gations of the respective parties, the material issues at stake, and then
organizing them in a form which will serve as an adequate basis for
adjudication. This civil law mode of pleading, in which both ques-
tions of fact and of law were indiscriminately intermingled was in-
applicable in the common law courts, whose dual character required
a separation of law from fact, as a prerequisite to determining whether
the trial was to be by court or jury. The very nature of the common
law tribunal required a separation on the record, from the mass of
complicated facts, the precise questions at issue, and this could only
be accomplished in advance of the trial by experienced lawyers, skilled
in the art of reducing all controversies to single, clear-cut, well-defined
issues, and in seeing that these issues appeared upon the written rec-
ord itself. As a result of this process of special pleading, by which
the record of every case is stripped of all extraneous matters, of ir-
relevant and immaterial issues, leaving nothing but the naked ques-
tions of fact or of law for decision by the court or the jury, the ad-
ministration of justice was greatly facilitated.
Without a distinct theory and law of evidence there can be no
certainty in administrative justice. A clear definition of rights and
liabilities goes for naught if, in judicial investigations, evidence is
admitted which ought to be rejected, and evidence is rejected which
ought to be admitted. The common-law pleading requirement of a
single, clear-cut, well-defined issue of fact was designed so as to guide
the judge in ruling on the relevancy of evidence, and it is in this par-
ticular that the common-law pleading system is vastly superior to that
of the civil law. The statements in civil pleadings are so loose and
vague that the issue in point is left in doubt, with the result that
much evidence is admitted which is relevant to no particular issue.
Moreover, under the common law, the evidence is heard by a jury, the
insurance of which, in Anglo-Saxon countries, is a chief end of gov-
70 Id. at 15, 16.
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emnient; and it is special pleading which makes that peculiar pro-
cedural device work, presenting the precise points to be determined,
and thereby indicating the character of the evidence required for
proof.
Thus, it is that "common-law pleading gives certainty to trials
at law, making the questions to be decided precise, the admission and
rejection of evidence definite, and retaining on the record, after the
trial, precision in everything, from the summons to the judgment, so
that it can be known what was in dispute, what was proved, and
what was adjudged."71
In closing the comparison of the two systems, perhaps a word
should be included concerning their political aspects. As the civil
law spread over the continent of Europe it carried with it its modes
of procedure, and although the people of Europe originally had the
same institutions as in England, nevertheless as the two groups of
people descended the streams of time, the evidence of relationship
gradually diminished and finally disappeared, with the result that
political freedom was effaced in Europe, whereas, in England, at the
same time there was a concurrent development of liberty and civiliza-
tion. Whatever the source, the fact remains that the Anglo-Saxon and
Anglo-Norman governments took a beneficent interest in the organi-
zation and development of courts, which, though emanating from the
Crown, were interposed between the sovereign and his subjects, in
such a way as to tend toward a limited monarchy. And it was the
continuance of this tendency in English judicial and political life
which finally secured to our ancestors a representative share in gov-
ernment, and made Parliament an organ of the people rather than
of the Crown. In Europe, where the imperial law of Rome under-
mined the Teutonic institutions, it was the King who controlled the
entire administration of justice. And the King's prerogative could
not be resisted by the courts as in England, as the law and only the
law it is, which can successfully resist the encroachments of des-
potism. As Tyler so well says: "In the absence of defined laws, and
an independent judiciary to enforce them, the only check upon arbi-
trary power is popular insurrection; and the people, after they have
overthrown by force one despotism, are liable, by their excess, as all
history shows, to succumb to another."7 2
71 Id. at 17.
72 Id. at 19.
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In the great contest between civil law and the Teutonic laws and
institutions, which took place all over Europe after the fall of the
Roman Empire, the Teutonic, under the Anglo-Saxon, prevailed in
England, and at Runnymede and Marston Moor, King John was
forced to sign Magna Carta, recognizing as fundamental rights of the
people the principles of the common law. And soon thereafter, under
the generative impulse of the common law, a representative system of
government, composed of aristocracy, democracy, and monarchy was
established; and it is this system so established which has served as
a model for our form of government. Under it, as Bracton so early
realized, has been vindicated the principle of the supremacy of the
law over the King. During Edward I's reign (1272-1307) the foun-
dations of the common law were securely laid. Then it was decided
that the clergy, who favored the civil law, could no longer be permit-
ted a monopoly of legal learning, for the "inns of court" were set up,
where men could devote their lives to the study of the common law,
and from this group Edward selected his judges. Under their guid-
ance the principles of the common law and the modes of procedure
were systematized; the courts were organized, and statutes which
were enacted for reforming the law were framed with reference to the
principles of Magna Carta and the common law.
And during the Elizabethan period of English history the charac-
ter of English jurisprudence was fixed forever on the basis of the
common law. Men like Lord Bacon and Lord Coke repudiated the
civil law as inapplicable to the English polity, and from then ,on the
common law has held to the direction then given to it, carrying
within itself 'an inherent force of expansion and progressiveness.173
It consists of elementary principles capable of indefinite development
in their applications to the ever-varying and increasing exigencies of
society. "There are," declares Professor Tyler, "certain fundamental
maxims belonging to it which are never departed from. These are the
immutable basis of the system. There are other maxims which are re-
stricted by modifications or limited by exceptions. It is pre-eminently
a practical system. It has broken away from the shackles of theory and
technicality when, in the changing conditions of society and of proper-
ty, justice and expediency required it. For a time the ancient rules and
practice may have resisted the equitable demands of the new exigencies
in human life; but when the new exigencies have shown themselves to
73 Id. at 21.
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be permanent interests in society, English jurisprudence has always
found within its acknowledged frame of justice means of providing for
the new rights and obligations which have sprung from the ever-widen-
ing sphere of civilization. The method of its progress is simple and
plain. When a case is brought into a court the first question which le-"
gitimately emerges from the facts is, whether there is any statute which
provides for it. If there is none, then it is inquired whether there be any
clear principle of common law which fixes the rights and obligations of
the parties. If the answer be again in the negative, then springs up the
inquiry, whether there be any principle of the common law which, by
analogy or parity of reason, ought to govern. If from neither of these
sources a principle of adjudication for the case can be educed, it is
recognized as a new case, and the principles of natural justice are
applied to its solution. But if the principles of natural justice, on ac-
count of any technical or other impediment, cannot be applied to the
settlement of the respective rights of the parties, then, by the im-
mutable juridical principles of the common law, founded upon the
jealous limitation of judicial discretion, if equity cannot relieve, the
case must fail; and provision can only be made by statute for future
cases of like nature. It matters not how the civil law or other for-
eign jurisprudence may have disposed of the question, unless, upon
one of the principles which have been stated, the case can be ad-
judged, the party must fail of relief who seeks the aid of a court.
'The Roman law,' said Tindal, C. J., in Acton v. Blundell,74 'forms no
rule, binding in itself, upon the subjects of these realms; but, in de-
ciding a case upon principle, where no direct authority can be cited
from our books, it affords no small evidence of the soundness of the
conclusion at which we have arrived, if it proves to be supported by
that law, the fruit of the researches of the most learned men, the
collective wisdom of ages, and the ground-work of the municipal law
of most of the countries in Europe.'
"Upon such principles has the common law based its practice
and developed its science. From first to last, through the courts at
Westminster, the common law has resisted the introduction of the civil
law into the jurisprudence of England. At the very time that the
Tudors and the Stuarts were grasping at high prerogative the common
law was maturing its vigor in the courts. Coke, one of their judges,
did more to develop and organize it for protecting the individual
74 12 M. & W. 324, 351, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1234 (1843).
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against arbitrary power than any man who has appeared in the prog-
ress of English society. In him the professional instinct of the com-
mon law judge reached its sublimest sense of human right. He saw
that the English constitution draws its whole life from the common
law, and is but the frame-work of its living spirit. By the common
law 'every man's house is called his castle. Why? Because it is sur-
rounded by a moat or defended by a wall? No! It may be a straw-
built hut; the wind may whistle through it, the rain may enter it, but
the king cannot.'
"In all the various revolutions, with their dark and dreary scenes
of violence and bloodshed, through which England has passed, the
people have clung to their ancient laws with a devotion almost super-
stitious. When our forefathers established governments in America
they laid their foundations on the common law. And when difficulties
grew up between them and the mother country, they acted as their
English ancestors had always acted in their political troubles-inter-
posed the common law as the shield against arbitrary power. When
the United Colonies met in Congress, in 1774, they claimed the com-
mon law of England as a branch of those 'indubitable rights and lib-
erties to which the respective colonies are entitled.' And the common
law, like a silent providence is still the preserver of our liberties.""IS*
75 STEPmN, A TREATISE ON T PRmc PLEs oF PLNADG iN C= ACTIONs, Intro-
duction, 23 (3d Am. ed. by Tyler, Washington, D. C. 1893).
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